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Food, Animals, and the Environment: An Ethical Approach, by Christopher Schlottmann and Jeff 
Sebo, is a clearly written, accessible introduction to a variety of topics and issues in food ethics. 
Though a textbook, Food, Animals, and the Environment (which I’ll henceforth refer to as FAE) does 
more than just explain concepts, arguments, and facts—it also makes a significant contribution to an 
established but still developing field. Food ethics is an interdisciplinary area that lies at the inter-
section of animal ethics, environmental ethics, business ethics, and political philosophy (among other 
areas). Although other books have been written about it, many of them are anthologies, and thus they 
lack the systematicity of a single or co-authored text. Furthermore, none of the non-anthological 
books that have so far been published bring together the particular array of topics and issues covered 
in FAE. Schlottmann and Sebo thus contribute to the development of food ethics by incorporating 
these topics and issues into a single book, and by doing such a great job of showing how they’re 
related to one another.   
Though FAE’s chapters aren’t explicitly divided into subsections, it’s appropriate to think of 
them as falling under three main groupings. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provide the theoretical and concep-
tual background needed to evaluate issues in food ethics. In addition to the most prominent theories 
in normative ethics (35-45), topics covered in these chapters include the concept of naturalness (11-
17), methodology and the use of thought experiments in moral theory (30-5), and different accounts 
of moral status, and their implications for the scope of the moral community (49-57). Chapters 5, 6, 
and 7 are largely (but not entirely) empirical—they provide information about the different ways 
agriculture impacts animals, the environment, and human beings; as well as a comparison of the 
impacts that different agricultural systems have, e.g., industrial agriculture, organic agriculture, and 
plant-based agriculture. Finally, chapters 8, 9, 10, and 11 respectively each cover different, but 
closely related applied ethical topics—specifically the ethics of food production, food consumption, 
legal food activism, and illegal food activism.  
Though the chapters preceding chapter 8 are valuable in part because they provide back-
ground material that’s helpful for assessing the applied ethical issues covered in the third part of the 
book, the authors correctly note that the different parts can be read independently of one another. 
They note that ‘Chapters 2, 3, and 4 can serve as an introduction to moral theory and moral status … 
[and] Chapters 5, 6, and 7 can serve as an introduction to industrial and non-industrial food systems’ 
(5). Similarly, the applied ethical chapters in the third part of the book can be read on their own, 
particularly by readers who already possess some familiarity with moral theory and the impacts of 
different food systems.  
One of FAE’s virtues is its commitment to helping readers intelligently formulate their own 
opinions. When approaching a given issue, the authors usually proceed by identifying the main po-
sitions available and the considerations relevant to deciding between them. Considerations often dis-
cussed include (but are not exhausted by) the major normative ethical theories canvassed in the first 
section of the book (Utilitarianism, Kantianism, etc.), and whether some of them would likely support 
one side of the issue while others would likely support the other side. Of particular note, however, is 
the authors’ open-mindedness about the implications of any given normative ethical theory, as well 
as about the possibilities for combining and/or balancing the available positions in creative ways. 
For example, when discussing the different possible goals of food activism, Schlottmann and Sebo 
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note that two major competing possibilities are to advocate for the abolition of animal agriculture or 
for stricter regulations (210-11). Though they note that Kantians tend to be attracted to abolition and 
that Utilitarians tend to be attracted to regulation, they also note that a case for regulation could very 
well be made form a Kantian perspective, specifically a case for regulations strict enough to (argua-
bly) render animal agriculture consistent with animal rights, and that a case for abolition could very 
well be made from a Utilitarian perspective (Perhaps advocating for abolition is likely to produce 
better consequences over the long term than advocating for regulation?). What’s more, they note that 
abolition and regulation can productively be thought of as opposite points on a spectrum, rather than 
as a pair of mutually exclusive alternatives. Whatever food system we think we should be advocating 
for, it’s either going to be closer to or further from industrial animal agriculture. Food systems closer 
to industrial animal agriculture, e.g., free-range animal agriculture, can be thought of as regulationist, 
whereas food systems further from industrial animal agriculture, e.g., entirely plant-based agricul-
ture, can be thought of as abolitionist. Considering that various possibilities exist along the middle 
of this spectrum, Schlottmann and Sebo invite readers to think about how abolitionist or how 
regulationist food activism should be, instead of whether food activism should be abolitionist or 
whether it should be regulationist. An example of the sort of mid-spectrum possibility Schlottmann 
and Sebo have in mind is communities organized in the manner Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka 
envision, i.e., intentional communities that involve some animal labor and some animal products, but 
where animals are respected and receive an equitable share of the benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation (Zoopolis: a Political Theory of Animal Rights, Oxford University Press, 2011, 134-42).  
In so far as FAE is concerned specifically with animals, its focus is understandably on 
domesticated animals who are involved in agriculture. There is some discussion of wild animals, 
though, and my impression of that discussion is somewhat mixed. On the one hand, I appreciate the 
authors’ realism about the hardships that wild animals face. Writers working in applied ethics some-
times have a rosy view of life in the wild, but as Schlottmann and Sebo note, the lives that most wild 
animals live are worse than the lives that most animals live on free range farms. Unlike animals on 
free range farms, wild animals lack easy access to food or shelter, and they aren’t protected from 
predation (164-5). Of course, from an animal rights perspective, free range farms are still morally 
problematic—they restrict liberties (albeit less so than industrial farms), involve questionable breed-
ing practices, and kill many animals, too (166-7). In so far as the case against such practices depends 
upon using a baseline for comparison, though—a baseline in light of which animals on free range 
farms are living worse lives than they otherwise could be are thus appropriately thought of as 
harmed—that baseline can’t, as the authors note, be life in the wild, since life in the wild is worse. A 
better baseline is life in the sort of intentional communities that Donaldson and Kymlicka envision 
(168).  
On the other hand, Schlottmann and Sebo don’t explore the implications that wild animal 
suffering may have for the relationship between animal and environmental ethics. Considering that 
FAE lies at the intersection of these areas, some discussion is called for. I have no doubt that to some 
extent the authors are right to claim that our concern for animals and our concern for the environment 
are mutually supportive (1-3). Industrial agriculture, and many of its alternatives, have a significant 
negative impact on domesticated animals and on the environment, and thus an interest in protecting 
animals and protecting the environment overlap when we focus on domesticated animals specifically. 
When we focus on wild animals, though, some possible tension emerges. Traditionally, environ-
mentalists have been concerned with minimizing our impact on the environment, though some are 
open to the idea that we should try to impact it in ways that promote environmental values such as 
biodiversity (14-15). By contrast, concern for wild animal suffering suggests that we not only have 
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environmental reasons to intervene, but that we should be intervening to improve wild animals’ lives 
(for discussion, see Oscar Horta’s “Animal Suffering in Nature” and my “Animal Rights and the 
Problem of r-Strategists”). Whether there’s a tension between promoting wild animal welfare, and 
promoting environmental values such as conservation or biodiversity, is a question worth highlight-
ing. What’s more, concern for wild animal suffering raises questions about whether the environmen-
tal impacts of animal agriculture should always be thought of as costs and nothing else. For example, 
suppose that animal agriculture causes the extinction of a species whose members normally live 
terrible lives (perhaps most of their young die painful deaths only shortly after being born). Would 
this be a bad thing or a good thing from a perspective concerned, at least in part, with wild animals’ 
wellbeing? The answer depends on various factors – on whether this species’ members typically 
experience more suffering than enjoyment over the course of their lives, on whether we use a conse-
quentialist or a deontological approach, on the broader ecological consequences of the species’ 
extinction, etc., but the fact that there is a real moral question here ought to be noted.  
My concerns about the implications of wild animal suffering aside, FAE is a comprehensive 
and accessible book that simultaneously manages to introduce and contribute to food ethics. I highly 
recommend it. 
Kyle Johannsen, Trent University 
   
  
